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This thesis examines the historical effectiveness of anti-ship cruise missiles used in
littoral warfare. Missile leakage rates, probability of hit on a given target, and small
combatant staying power with respect to Exocet missile equivalents are derived from
historical data. These parameters are extended to modern U. S. warships displacing 7,000
tons or less, which are expected to operate in littoral waters, to determine the number of
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The modern ships of today's U. S. Navy are designed to be extremely effective in
combating incoming enemy threats. The layered defense in depth concept provides a
"steel curtain" of defenses, making it virtually impossible for any threat to penetrate into a
combat alert battle group. But the shape of warfare is changing, allowing less space and
less time for reaction to the enemy and its threats. The term "littoral warfare" has been
used almost exclusively to describe the threats the Navy will encounter in the near future.
The ability of the Navy to adapt to this new environment will determine how successful
the Navy will be and what roles and missions it will play.
Naval battles have been fought only in the littoral arena since the first anti-ship
cruise missile was fired in anger in 1967. Conflicts such as the Indo-Pakistan War of
1971, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1987, the Falklands War
of 1982, the Battle of Sidra in 1986, Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, and the Gulf War
of 1991 all were littoral scenarios matching various formidable offensive capabilities of
anti-ship weapons with the defenses of the naval vessel. Reduced battle space, reduced
reaction time, land launched anti-ship weapons as well as air and ship launched anti-ship
weapons, and the lack of layered defenses are the common denominator in all the above
conflicts.
Raw data was collected on each of the ships and the missiles involved in the above
conflicts. Probability of hit was computed for three different types of targets which anti-
ship missiles were employed against. These targets consisted of defenseless, defendable,
and defended targets. Additionally, ship full load displacement, total missile weight,
warhead explosive content, and missile speed were gathered to develop a functional
relationship between ship and missile characteristics for ships put out of action and ships
sunk. This relationship was used to predict the number of missiles needed to put modern
warships out of action and to sink them.
IX
There are many lessons to be learned from the historical record of anti-ship




Post 1982 Probability of
Hit
Defenseless Target 0.913 0.981
Defendable Target 0.684 0.630
Defended Target 0.264 0.450
Table 1. Probability of Hit by Category.
The trend in this data favors the anti-ship cruise missile, with a marked increase in the
probability of hitting a defended target. Ship defensive firepower and staying power must
increase proportionately if ships are to survive in combat situations of the future.
Softkill measures employed against anti-ship missiles were extremely successful,
seducing or decoying every missile they were used against. In every engagement where a
defender was alert and deployed softkill measures, every missile salvo was entirely
defeated.
Hardkill measures were not as successful, with only one case confirmed. This is
understandable since hardkill measures used to date have primarily consisted of manual
firing systems. More data is needed to assess the combat capabilities of modern hardkill
systems.
For the ships in the data set, an average of 1 .2 hits put the ships out of action,
while an average of 1.8 hits sank the ships. With these numbers, a leakage rate of 0.25 or
higher would have a disastrous impact on the outcome of the conflict. It is emphasized
that the ordnance quantity-full load displacement relationship is based wholly on a
statistical correlation. It is hard to find a physical explanation for why combat kills would
correlate best with missile kinetic energy, while sinkings correlate best with missile
explosive content. It is also emphasized that because most anti-ship missile victims were
small warships, this analysis is unreliable when extended to warship larger than 7,000 tons
displacement. Accepting these cautions, the following figure is offered as the best possible
functional relationship between the number of anti-ship missile hits (normalized to Exocet
missile equivalents) and combat kills or sinkings as a function of warship size, based on 30
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The modern ships of today's U. S. Navy are designed to be extremely effective in
combating incoming enemy threats. The layered defense in depth concept provides a
"steel curtain" of defenses, making it virtually impossible for any threat to penetrate into a
combat alert battle group. But the shape of warfare is changing. Less space and less time
for reaction are allowed for the enemy and its threats. The term "littoral warfare" has
been used almost exclusively to describe the threats the Navy will encounter in the near
future. The ability of the Navy to adapt to this new environment will determine how
successful the Navy will be and what roles and missions it will play.
Naval battles have been fought only in the littoral arena since the first anti-ship
cruise missile was fired in anger in 1967. Conflicts such as the Indo-Pakistan War of
1971, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1987, the Falklands War
of 1982, the Battle of Sidra in 1986, Operation Praying Manus in 1988, and the Gulf War
of 1991 all were littoral scenarios matching various formidable offensive capabilities of
anti-ship weapons with the defenses of the naval vessel. Reduced battle space, reduced
reaction time, land launched anti-ship weapons as well as air and ship launched anti-ship
weapons, and the lack of layered defenses are the common denominator in all the above
conflicts.
Of all the existing threats, the most formidable is the anu-ship cruise missile.
Today, 66 countries possess anti-ship cruise missiles, with 43 of these countries
being Third World countries. Supersonic and/or sea skimming missiles launched from
land, air, or sea would test the U. S. abilities to counter these threats, especially under
adverse littoral conditions. [Ref. 1]
Previous conflicts mentioned above provide insight as to the methods of
employment and time factors that play a significant role in the outcome of each attack.
These scenarios have three categories of targets for anti-ship cruise missiles. The
first is the defenseless target, having no capabilities to engage or deceive an incoming
missile. The second is the defendable target, which has the capability to engage or
deceive an incoming missile but does not, due to surprise, inattentiveness, or equipment
malfunction. The third is the defended target, which utilizes hard kill and/or soft kill
defenses to defeat incoming missiles. Hard kill defenses refer to organic missiles or guns,
or escort/battle group hard kill capabilities. Soft kill defenses refer to deception seduction,
jamming, maneuver, or other tactics to defeat an incoming missile without destroying it.
The most valid evaluation of a weapon system's effectiveness comes from
observing its performance in actual combat against an enemy. Experience thus gained is
invaluable in developing and predicting the effectiveness of new systems. [Ref. 2]
The goal of this thesis is to provide a statistical analysis of the effectiveness of anti-
ship missiles in previous littoral scenarios, in order to extrapolate possible implications for
future littoral scenarios faced by the U. S. Navy. Analysis will be conducted on the
historical probability of hit by a missile (susceptability) and warship damage when hit
(vulnerability).
II. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
A. DATA COLLECTION
The first step was an extensive search for references detailing all anti-ship cruise
missiles fired in anger. Although complete information was not available for every missile
launching, data was normally not difficult to find regarding total missiles launched, number
of missiles assessed as hitting their targets, damage from the missile impact, number of
missiles which missed their targets and type of missile used. Information on numbers of
personnel casualties (killed or injured) was not always readily available however. Where
casualty data was ascertained, it is documented, so that some inferences may be drawn.
Sources for the information gathered in this chapter are listed in the bibliography.
1. Sinking of the Eilat (1967)
The first anti-ship cruise missile attack occurred in 1967, off the coast of Port Said
in the Mediterranean Sea. While on her daily patrol of the Sinai coast, well within
Egyptian territorial waters, the Israeli Destroyer Eilat was attacked with Soviet made Styx
missiles that had been fired from Osa-class missile patrol boats. The ship was surprised by
the attack, and took no measures to defeat the incoming missiles or engage the Egyptian
missile boats involved in the attack. Four Styx missiles were fired at the Eilat. Three
found their target. The fourth missile may have missed due to the lack of visible freeboard
on the Eilat for the missile to acquire. Forty-seven sailors were killed and 91 sailors were
wounded in a crew of 250. After the attack, it was revealed that Israeli intelligence knew
of the missile threat present in Port Said, but failed to pass this information to the Captain
of the Eilat. This incident is classified as a defendable target. The Eilat was equipped with
4.5 inch guns and 40mm guns, but did not use either because of surprise.
2. Sinking of the Orit (1970)
In 1970, the Egyptians sensed that war with the Israelis was a possibility. They
also saw the Israeli Navy transformed into a surface fleet of smaller, more maneuverable
patrol boats. Knowing the Styx missile was not designed to attack such small,
maneuverable targets, the Egyptians attempted to assess their ability against the Israeli
patrol boats. An Israeli fishing vessel, the Orit, wandered into Egyptian territorial waters.
An attack was conducted on the Orit, using four Styx missiles. Although no missiles hit
the vessel, a near miss was enough to sink the wooden vessel. The two men onboard the
fishing vessel escaped unharmed. Since the Orit was roughly one-third the size of the
Israeli patrol boats, this engagement showed limited capability for the Styx missile to
attack a small target. This incident is classified as defenseless target for obvious reasons.
3. The Indo-Pakistan War (1971)
In 197 1, war broke out between India and Pakistan. On the night of December 4,
three Indian missile patrol boats, escorted by two Indian destroyers, bombarded the port
of Karachi in a surprise attack. Seven Styx missiles were fired toward the harbor. Six
found a target. Two Pakistani destroyers, the Khaibar and the Badr, were on patrol near
the harbor. Each received a single missile hit. The Khaibar sunk, while the Badr was
severely damaged. The missile impacted at the Badr's bridge, destroying all command and
control capability. One additional naval vessel, the minesweeper Muhafiz, sank after a
single Styx missile hit. Command and control capability was destroyed for the entire port
of Karachi, causing shore batteries to fire on their own vessels repeatedly throughout the
remainder of the conflict. A count of personnel casualties was not available to the author.
Both the Khaibar and the Badr were equipped with 4.5 inch guns and 40mm guns. The
guns were not used by either vessel due to surprise. This incident is classified as a
defendable target.
4. Indo-Pakistan War: Merchant Vessel Attack (1971)
On the night of December 8, a single missile patrol boat was detached to attack
shore targets in Karachi harbor. The missile boat launched two Styx missiles. One hit an
oil storage tank. The other hit a British merchant ship and sank it. This incident is
classified as a defenseless target.
In summary, the Indo-Pakistan War produced nine Styx missile launchings. Eight
of these missiles hit both land and sea targets. In one night, the Indian Navy put 25% of
the Pakistani Navy out of action and demonstrated that attacking the enemy effectively
first is both possible and rooted in sound logic.
5. Arab-Israeli War: Battle of Latakia (1973)
In October 1973, the Arab-Israeli War broke out. This conflict produced the first
missile boat on missile boat engagement in history. The Egyptians and the Syrians were
armed with the Styx anti-ship cruise missile, with a range of about 25 nautical miles. The
Israelis were armed with the Gabriel missile with a range of approximately 12 nautical
miles. The first battle took place on October 6, 1973. The Israelis were actively
patrolling the coastal area around Latakia with five Saar-class missile patrol boats. Only
four of the Saars were missile equipped. The Israeli vessels were detected off shore by
two Syrian picket ships - a torpedo boat and a minesweeper. The Syrian ships engaged
the Israeli force with gunfire with little effect. Both the Syrian ships were sunk, one
exclusively with gunfire, the other with three Gabriel missile hits. Syrian missile boats
were alerted, however, and launched their Styx missiles against the Israeli force. Eight
Styx missiles were launched and all were deceived by Avshalom (chaff) launches. The
Israeli missile boats returned fire by launching five Gabriel missiles and scoring four hits.
One Komar-class missile boat was sunk with a single missile hit. A second Komar-class
missile boat was hit with one Gabriel missile and run aground. It was later destroyed by
gunfire. Lastly, one Osa-class missile boat was sunk with two Gabriel missile hits. In
summary, eleven Gabriel missiles were launched and six hit their target. Eight Styx
missiles were launched by the Syrians with no combat kills. These were all engagements
between defended targets.
6. Arab-Israeli War: The Battle of Baltim (1973)
The Battle of Baltim took place off the Egyptian coast on the night of October 8,
1973. A force of six Saar-class missile boats (five missile equipped) were engaged by four
Osa-class missile boats. The Osa-class missile boats launched their Styx missiles first at
the Israeli force at a range near 25 nautical miles and immediately fled towards the shore
at high speed. The Israeli force evaded the Styx missiles, pursued, closed to within
Gabriel launch range and launched twelve Gabriel missiles. Three Osa-class missile boats
were sunk. Each received two missile hits. The fourth Osa-class missile boat escaped
undamaged into the harbor. In summary, twelve Gabriel missiles were launched and six
hit their target. Sixteen Styx missiles were launched with no successful hits. These
engagements are categorized as defended targets.
7. Arab-Israeli War: Second Battle of Latakia (1973)
A second clash between Syrian and Israeli forces took place off the coast of
Latakia on the night of October 10, 1973. Seven Saar-class missile boats were actively
patrolling and bombarding the Syrian harbor. A Syrian force, consisting of one torpedo
boat, one conventional patrol boat and three Osa-class missile boats, challenged the Israeli
force. A new and unique tactic was utilized by the Syrian force during this battle. Syrian
missile boats maintained large merchant vessels between their missile boats and the Israeli
force. They darted out from behind the merchant vessels only to launch their missiles.
The merchant vessels served as missile decoys, which provided the Syrian missile boats
with additional defensive capability. A volley of missiles ensued. Eight Gabriel missiles
were launched at the Syrian force and twelve Styx missiles were launched at the Israeli
force. Five of eight Gabriel missiles hit targets, but two of the targets were merchant
vessels. Two Osa-class missile boats were sunk. One was hit with two Gabriel missiles
and one was hit with a single Gabriel missile. All twelve Styx missiles were deceived with
chaff launches, active jamming, and high speed tactical maneuvering. The missile boat on
missile boat engagements are categorized as defended targets; however, the merchant
vessels hit are categorized as defenseless targets.
8. Arab-Israeli War: Battle of Tartus (1973)
A final force on force battle took place off the coast of Tartus on October 1 1
,
1973, just before midnight. Five Saar-class missile boats were shelling Syrian oil storage
tanks and shore counter-fire batteries when they were challenged by two Osa-class missile
boats. As in the previous battle, the Syrians used merchant vessels for protection. In the
ensuing exchange, eight Gabriel missiles were launched at the Syrians and three Styx
missiles were launched at the Israelis. Both Osa-class missile boats were sunk. They took
two Gabriel missile hits each. Two Gabriel missiles hit a Russian merchant ship, and it
sank. All three Styx missiles missed their target due to chaff launches and active jamming
equipment. The missile boat on missile boat engagements are categorized as defended
targets. The merchant vessel hit is categorized as a defenseless target.
9. Arab-Israeli War: Additional Incidents (1973)
Additional clashes occurred during the war, in which only one side launched its
missiles against the enemy forces and no missiles hit their targets. On October 6, an Israeli
force of two Saar-class missile boats attacked an Egyptian force consisting of five Osa-
class missile boats. Eleven Gabriel missiles were launched, but none hit their target. The
Egyptian force fled to the safety of Alexandria Harbor. On October 7, after the successful
Israeli engagement of the Syrian force, two Kornar-class Syrian missile boats challenged
the Israeli force of five Saar-class missile boats. The Syrian missile boats launched four
Styx missiles from the mouth of Latakia harbor and ducked back inside. No Styx found
their targets. On October 12, two Egyptian Komar-class missile boats fired four Styx
missiles at three Israeli tank landing ships (LSTs). All four missiles missed and exploded
inland. All incidents are classified as defended targets.
In summary, 19 of 50 Gabriel missiles hit their targets (discounting the merchant
vessels hit), while zero of 47 Styx missiles hit their targets. Some reports claim as many
as 55 Styx missiles were fired. In the war there were three instances where incoming
missiles were downed by small arms or machine gun fire. Many of the officers involved
believed the missiles had been or would have been diverted from the ships by the
electronic warfare measures employed. Therefore, a firm assessment of hardkill
effectiveness cannot be made. All missile boat on missile boat engagements of the Arab-
Israeli War are classified as defended targets utilizing missiles, decoys and jammers for
defensive capability. The three cases involving merchant vessels are classified as
defenseless targets.
10. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1987)
In September of 1980, the Iran-Iraq War began. The major naval involvement
was the so called Tanker War. It was conducted by both Iran and Iraq. The Tanker War
was designed to stop the export of oil through the Arabian Gulf. Attacks concentrated on
transiting unprotected oil tankers and freighters. Although there are no exact numbers of
missiles fired and hits, reports through 1984 show 52 of 53 Exocet anti-ship missiles hit
their targets, and 50 of the 52 hits detonated properly [Ref. 12]. No new tactics were
developed until the reflagging effort of the United States. The Exocet missile remained
unchanged throughout the duration of the war; therefore, it is assumed that the
performance of the missile continued as it did up through 1984. Results of missile hits
differ with the size of the vessel hit. Among smaller freighters/tankers of 13,000 to 30,000
tons displacement, a split of 20% sinking, 60% major damage, and 20% minor damage
was produced. Of large tankers 70,000 to 300,000 tons displacement, 60% of the ships
were heavily damaged, and 40% saw minor damage. All incidents here are classified as
defenseless targets, since the only defense these tankers had against ASCM attacks was
size. In 1987, when the reflagging effort began and tankers were escorted by naval
vessels, missile attacks on tankers ceased.
11. Falkland* War: Attacks on Argentine Patrol Boats (1982)
The initial use of anti-ship missiles of the Falklands War occurred on May 3, 1982,
when two British Lynx helicopters attacked two Argentine patrol boats with Sea Skua
missiles which had been hastily fitted on Lynx helicopters. Each helicopter fired two
missiles and achieved four hits. The Alferez Sobral (A-9) took two missile hits and
sustained severe damage, but it was later repaired. The Somellera (A- 10) took two
missile hits and sank. Both patrol boats attempted to engage the incoming missiles with
20mm and 40mm rounds, but they failed to score any hits. This incident is categorized as
a defended target.
12. Falklands War: Attack on HMS Sheffield (1982)
The best known incident of the Falklands War is the sinking of HMS Sheffield. On
May 4, 1982, HMS Sheffield was assigned a radar picket station along the Argentine
coast. An Argentine Super Etendard attack aircraft fired two AM-39 Exocet air to
surface missiles indiscriminately at the British force. One missile did not acquire a target.
The other missile hit HMS Sheffield. Although the missile warhead did not detonate,
rocket fuel ignited and caused extensive fires to burn out of control. The ship was
eventually scuttled. Due to limited battle space and lack of forewarning, HMS Sheffield
did not take any actions to counter the incoming Exocet missile. This incident falls under
the category of a defendable target.
13. Falklands War: Firing at HMS Ambuscade (1982)
On May 25, the Argentines launched a major air attack on the British force.
Skyhawks (A-4s) and Super Etendard aircraft attacked the British ships guarding the
entrance to Falkland Sound. The A-4s attacked the picket ships, while the Super
Etendards punched through and attacked the main British fleet which was patrolling
farther to the east. The Super Etendards attacked the first major ship to appear on their
radar. Two Super Etendards fired one Exocet missile each. Their target, the HMS
Ambuscade, detected the missile launches and launched chaff to decoy the missiles. The
chaff was successful in seducing the missiles away from the HMS Ambuscade. This
incident is classified as a defended target, which was successfully defended.
14. Falklands War: Sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor (1982)
Once through the chaff cloud, the Exocet missiles that had been fired at the HMS
Ambuscade looked for another target. The target they acquired was the converted
VTOL/helicopter carrier SS Atlantic Conveyor. Both missiles locked on this target, and
both missiles hit and detonated despite the use of small arms and machine guns to fire at
the missiles. Twelve sailors were killed, and the Atlantic Conveyor sank six days later due
to uncontrollable fires. Both the escort ships and the Atlantic Conveyor took measures to
counter the incoming missile, but to no avail. This incident is classified as a defended
target.
15. Falklands War: Attack on HMS Avenger (1982)
Although the Argentines did not have the shore launched version of the Exocet
missile, they managed to produce a trailer-mounted MM-38 Exocet missile. On May 27,
this missile was launched at the HMS Avenger. The HMS Avenger neither took evasive
action nor tried to engage, but the Exocet did not hit its target. Although the missile did
not hit, this incident is classified as a defendable target because the HMS Avenger took no
measures to engage the incoming missile.
16. Falklands War: Attempted Attack on HMS Invincible (1982)
Argentine Skyhawks and Super Etendards attacked the British task force on May
30. Their aim was to sink or damage HMS Invincible, the British carrier. One Exocet
missile was launched from a Super Etendard, but it did not hit its target. This incident is
classified as a defended target, although it is not known what defense was actually taken.
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Some reports claim the Exocets were engaged by guns, but other reports claim the
missiles were seduced away by chaff.
17. Falklands War: Attack on HMS Glamorgan (1982)
On June 1 1 , a shore based Exocet missile was fired at HMS Glamorgan as it
bombarded Port Stanley at night. HMS Glamorgan attempted to shoot down the
incoming missile with a Sea Cat missile, but it failed. The Exocet detonated near the
helicopter hangar, killing 13 sailors and injuring 17 sailors. HMS Glamorgan suffered
slight damage and was out of action for 36 hours. This incident is classified as a defended
target.
18. Falklands War: Attack on HMS Penelope (1982)
Also on June 1 1, while in company with HMS Glamorgan, HMS Penelope was
attacked by an anti-ship missile. It is unclear exactly what kind of missile was used in this
attack, but one strong possibility is the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship cruise missile. It was
suspected after the war that the Israelis may have sold Gabriel missiles to the Argentines.
This missile did not hit its target and exploded harmlessly in the water. This incident is
classified as a defendable target. Although the missile did not hit its target, no measures
were taken to engage the missile.
19. Battle of Sidra (1986)
The United States attacked Libya on March 24, 1986. Libya's claims of territorial
waters and the "line of death" provoked the United States into action. On the first day of
this minor conflict, a Libyan Combattante II G missile equipped patrol boat was sunk with
one Harpoon anti-ship missile that was launched from an A-6E Intruder. Later the same
night, a Nanuchka II patrol boat was sunk by two Harpoon missiles. In all, six Harpoon
missiles were fired at various targets, resulting in the three hits mentioned above. The
reason for the Harpoon misses is believed to result from firing at "phantom targets" which
the Libyans used to trick the United States into firing unnecessary missiles. It is unknown
n
whether the successful Harpoon missiles were engaged by the patrol boats, but, due to the
political climate of the time, it is assumed that Libya was aware of possible United States
aggression and engaged the incoming missiles. These incidents are classified as defended
targets.
20. USS Stark Incident (1987)
The USS Stark (FFG-31) was attacked while on patrol in the Persian Gulf by an
Iraqi F- 1 Mirage aircraft. The pilot had mistakenly identified the USS Stark as an Iranian
warship. The pilot fired two Exocet anti-ship missiles approximately 30 seconds apart.
Both missiles hit the USS Stark, but only one warhead detonated. Rocket fuel from both
missiles kept the fire burning uncontrollably for many hours. The fires were eventually
extinguished and the ship brought into port. Heroic efforts of the crew saved the USS
Stark from sinking, but it was out of action for nearly one and a half years. Thirty-seven
sailors died in the attack. This incident is classified as a defendable target. The USS Stark
had the necessary equipment to engage the incoming missile, but, due to inattentiveness
and complacency, the missiles were not countered.
21. Operation Praying Mantis (1988)
Operation Praying Mantis was conducted by the United States against Iranian
targets in retaliation for Iran mining the Persian Gulf. The first engagement force
consisted of three U. S. warships: USS Wainwright (CG-28), USS Bagley (FF-1069) and
USS Simpson (FFG-56). They challenged an Iranian patrol boat, the Joshan. The Joshan
was warned that it was going to be attacked and elected to counter with the launch of a
Harpoon missile. All three U. S. warships and a U. S. helicopter detected the launch and
immediately deployed chaff. The missile passed down the starboard side of the USS
Wainwright, deceived by the chaff. The U. S. reply on the Joshan consisted of five
Standard missiles launched in the surface-to-surface mode, all five hitting the target, which
caused the Joshan to sink. A final Harpoon was launched against the Joshan, but missed
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due to the lack of freeboard present for the Harpoon missile guidance radar to acquire.
This incident is classified as a defended target for both the U. S. forces and the Iranian
patrol boat.
22. Operation Praying Mantis: Second Incident (1988)
The second incident of this conflict involved three U. S. warships: USS Joseph
Strauss (DDG-16), USS O'Brien (DD-975) and USS Jack Williams (FFG-24) and an
Iranian Saam-class frigate, the Sahand. The Sahand was first hit by an air launched
Harpoon from an A-6E aircraft. Two more Harpoons were fired at the Sahand, one air
launched and one surface launched. They achieved a near simultaneous time of impact.
The three Harpoon hits caused the Sahand to sink. This incident is classified as a
defendable target, because the Sahand made no observable attempt to engage the
incoming missiles.
23. Persian Gulf War (1990-1991)
The Persian Gulf War produced a limited number of missile engagements, because
most of the attacks conducted on naval targets were done by A-6Es with precision
guidance weapons and naval assets were used for tactical missile launches, picket duties
and the amphibious force escort. This war did provide a first. It occurred when HMS
Gloucester, using its Sea Dart system, shot down a Silkworm missile launched at the USS
Missouri on February 25, 1991. A second Silkworm was also fired at the USS Missouri,
but it did not hit its target. This is the first confirmed successful use of surface-to-air
missiles against an incoming missile attack in fifty years of anti-ship cruise missile
production and use. This incident is classified as a defendable target, which was defended
successfully.
24. Persian Gulf War: The Battle of Bubyian Island (1991)
The Battle of Bubyian Island on January 29-30, 1991, produced incidents matching
the helicopter launched anti-ship missile, the Sea Skua, against various smaller
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combatants. Fourteen Sea Skuas were launched and eight missiles hit their targets which
caused heavy damage to four small combatants. This battle is classified as defendable
targets, because no opposition was met by the Coalition helicopters.
25. USS Saratoga Incident (1992)
On October 1, 1992, the USS Saratoga, while taking part in a NATO exercise,
inadvertantly launched two Nato Sea Sparrow missiles at a Turkish destroyer, Mauvenet.
One missile hit the destroyer's bridge. It killed five sailors including the Commanding
Officer. The other missile did not hit a target. This incident is classified as a defendable
target, but could just as easily be regarded as a defenseless target. Fratricide complicates
this analysis, but since capabilities do exist to counter such a friendly "threat", these
incidents will fall into the defendable target category.
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III. MISSILE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
Warships are designed to counter incoming missile threats with a variety of
countermeasures. Battle group escorts, aircraft coverage, extended range sensors and
organic systems all contribute to protect warships against missile attacks. However, the
littoral setting degrades the above defenses. Not all missiles fired at warships in the past
have been engaged, and not all missiles engaged have been shot down or evaded. The
ability of a warship to recognize a threat and quickly engage or relay the information to a
warship that can engage will be the determining factor in warship survival.
A leaker is defined as a missile fired at a warship that pierces the defenses of the
warship or its escorts due to either superior performance by the missile or ineffective
performance by the warship or its escorts. The following is a historical look at how well
warship defenses have performed.
B. PROBABILITY OF MISSILE HIT
1. Defenseless Targets
The incidents catalogued in the previous chapter are broken into three categories.
The first category is defenseless targets. These targets are primarily merchant vessels
transiting a war zone. This category is valuable in the analysis because it demonstrated
that anti-ship missiles fired up to the present have been very accurate weapons, absent any
countermeasures taken to defeat them. Table 1 summarizes the data regarding
defenseless targets.
A probability of hit on defenseless targets is calculated as 57.5 hits divided by 63
total firings, or a probability of hit equal to 0.913. Historical data supports high reliability















4 Styx 1 1 1 2
7 Gabriel 2 2 2 2
8 Gabriel 2 1 1 2
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Exocet 52 37 7 53
Totals 57.5 42 12 63
Table 1 . Defenseless Targets.
2. Defendable Targets
The next category is the defendable target. The performance of anti-ship missiles
is degraded in this category, which intuitively makes sense. The ability of an attacked
warship to retaliate on the delivery platform should impact the accuracy of the missile
shot. An anti-ship missile launch platform may travel unimpeded to a defenseless target
and fire at ideal range to ensure a hit. An attack on a warship that could defend itself, if
alerted, would not allow for an attack at ideal range. This feature yields a larger
probability of missile failure or missile aiming error. In addition, warships involved in
incidents to date have been smaller on the average than defenseless merchant ships in the
previous category, which makes them more difficult to acquire. Table 2 summarizes the
data regarding defendable targets.
A probability of hit from defendable targets is calculated as 26 hits divided by 38
total firings for a probability of hit equal to 0.684. Warships are harder to hit, whether
they engage the incoming missile or not.
Near miss, enough to sink vessel.












1 Styx 3 1 1 4
3 Styx 6 3 2 7
12 Exocet 1 1 1 2
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Exocet 2 1 1 2
15 Exocet 1
18 Gabriel 1
20 Exocet 2 1 2
22 Harpoon 3 1 1 3
24 Sea Skua 8 4 14
25 Sea Sparrow 1 1 2
Totals 26 13 6 38
Table 2. Defendable Targets.
3. Defended Targets
The final category is the defended target. These targets are historically the most
difficult targets to hit, which should not come as a surprise. A variety of tactics and
weapons, primarily softkill, have been used to defeat missiles. It is interesting to note that
only one case of confirmed hardkill exists. Softkill, maneuver, decoys and deception have
been the primary means used against missiles to date. Table 3 summarizes data regarding
defended targets.
A probability of hit from defended targets is calculated as 32 hits divided by 121
total firings for a probability of hit equal to 0.264. On the average, warship defenses have
been able to shoot down or deceive 3 out of 4 missiles fired.












5 Gabriel 6 3 3 11
5 Styx 8
6 Gabriel 6 3 3 12
6 Styx 16
7 Gabriel 3 2 2 8
7 Styx 12









17 Exocet 1 1 1
19 Harpoon 3 2 1 6
21 Harpoon (US) 2
21 Standard 5 1 1 5
21 Harpoon(Iran) 1
23 Silkworm 2
Totals 32 16 13 121
Table 3. Defended Targets.
C. LEAKER PROBABILITY
The historical parameters calculated above can be extended for use in the
following formula:
Same missiles as incident 14.
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"ac x 'l\ac x "launch = "hit vU
where
PAC = Probability a missile acquires a target
Puac ~ Probability a missile is a leaker given it acquires the target
Nlaunch - Number of missiles launched
NHrr = Expected number of missile hits
Rearranging the formula, the probability of a leaker can be solved for explicitly:
'UAC = ("HIT + "LAUNCH > X + 'AC ) (2)
The term (NIm + NLAVNCH ) or probability of missile hit, was determined above for each
category of target. The term PAC is best estimated from the defenseless and defendable
categories, where no countermeasures were taken to defeat the missile. PAC is calculaled
by taking the total number of missile hits from the defenseless and defendable targets and
dividing that number by the total number of missiles from those two categories. This
calculation yields a PM equal to 83.5/101 or 0.827. For a warship in a littoral setting that
is surprised by an attack, the probability a missile hits a ship, given that it acquires the ship
as a target, is calculated as:
'UAC ~ (" HIT + "LAUNCH ' X ' ' "*" "AC >
= (26 -s- 38) x (1 + 0.827)
= 0.827
A similar calculauon done for defended warships yields the following probability of missile
leakers:
Puac = ("HrT + Hlaunch)* (I + Pac)
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= (32 + 121) x (1 + 0.827)
= 0.320
A second set of calculations was done for incidents involving modern warships with
modern anti-air warfare defenses. From the discussion in the previous chapter, data was
collected from incident 12 (sinking of the Sheffield in 1982) to the present. Using the
same value for PAc as calculated above, for a surprised ship in a littoral setting, the
probability a missile hits, given that it acquires the ship as a target, is calculated as:
'UAC ~ ("HIT + "LAUNCH > X U + 'AC '
= (17 + 27) x (1 + 0.827)
= 0.761
A similar calculation done for defended warships yields the following probability of missile
leakers:
"l\ac = ("hit + "launch ) X U "*" 'AC )
= (9 + 20) x (1 + 0.827)
= 0.544
While these numbers would not be expected to apply to the most modern U. S. warships,
such as the Ticonderoga class cruisers or the Arleigh Burke destroyers, they may apply to
such ships as the Perry class frigate (FFG-7), an Avenger class mine countermeasures ship
(MCM- 1), or a new construction coastal patrol ship (PC- 1) that do not have the capability




Staying power is defined as the capacity of a warship to take hits and continue
fighting, measured in the number of hits by a standard or notional weapon. A
methodology used by T. Beall [Ref. 3] estimated the staying power of warships after hits
by bombs, shells, and torpedoes from World War II data. His method is extended here to
predict the number of missiles needed to achieve a combat kill and to sink a warship.
B. DATA COLLECTION
The following quantitative data was collected on all warships damaged or sunk in
the conflicts documented previously for analysis:
• Ship full load displacement
• Missile total weight (lbs)
• Missile warhead weight (lbs high explosive or HE)
• Missile speed (Mach)
• Number of missiles used to put ship OOA
• Number of missiles used to sink ship
Appendix A summarizes the raw data collected for this analysis.
C. MODEL STRUCTURE FOR COMBAT KILLS
The goal of this analysis was to model the relationship between the number of
standard missile equivalents necessary to put a ship out of action and ship full load









= number of standard missile hits needed to put platform i out of action.
f(d, ) = function of the full load displacement of platform i, dl .
P , P | = constant coefficients.
The use of full load displacement as an explanatory variable is intuitively appealing.
It is the independent variable used by both T. Beall and R. Humphrey [Ref. 4]. Full load
displacement is also backed by data on tanker casualties in the Iran-Iraq War, where the
only defense a merchant ship had was its size. Tankers displacing between 13,000 and
30,000 tons were heavily damaged 80% of the time by single Exocet missile hits, while
tankers displacing 70,000 tons and greater were heavily damaged 60% of the time.
D. DATA ANALYSIS FOR COMBAT KILLS





was calculated from the raw data contained in Appendix A, which
contains all attack incidents against warships.
1. Independent Variable
Various functional forms of the full load displacement were examined to assess
which would provide the best fit curve. These functions included:








/(d.) = In (di) (8)
2. Dependent Variable
The total number of Exocet missile equivalents needed to put a ship out of action
was used as the dependent variable. The Exocet missile was chosen since its use and
effectiveness was widely known because of the Falklands War, the Tanker War, and the
attack on USS Stark. Each missile was normalized with respect to the Exocet missile
according to warhead explosive content (250 lbs high explosive), total missile weight
(1439 lbs), and total missile kinetic energy content. This value was calculated by applying
the equation describing kinetic energy:
KE =y2 x Mass x ( Velocity) 2 (9)
Because Exocet missile equivalents is in the form of a ratio, constants were disregarded in
the calculation of the standard value and other missile kinetic energy content. The
standard value was calculated by multiplying the total missile weight (1439 lbs) by the
missile velocity squared, or (0.93 Mach) 2 . These combinations produced 12 scatter plots
of dependent variable versus independent variable.
3. Analysis Procedure
Scatter plots were constructed, matching the different functional forms of full load
displacement against the three Exocet missile equivalent categories. Figure 1 is a scatter
plot of Exocet missile equivalents with respect to warhead weight versus full load
displacement for ships put out of action. It is apparent from this plot that a transformation
such as a natural logarithm or a cube root is needed to glean a relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. The line shown on the graph is an example of a
power function which is a best fit curve to the untransformed independent variable.
Square data points represent superimposed data.
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Figure 1
.
Exocet missile equivalents with respect to warhead weight versus full load
displacement with fitted line (OOA).
Linear regression was conducted to determine the least squares best fit line and the
R-squared value for each plot. (Equation (4) was transformed by taking the natural
logarithm of both sides of the equation, then linear regression was conducted on the
transformed model). The calculated linear and non-linear functions were then
superimposed over the scatter plots. Scatter plots for which the data appeared distributed
most evenly about the fitted line were further analyzed by conducting a Chi-square
goodness of fit test on the residuals to test that the errors in the linear regression model
are indeed mean zero normal random variables. For models still in contention, the one
with the highest R-squared value was selected as the appropriate model.
4. Results
The model that best fit the above criteria is as follows:
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St =0.0057 x(/(4)) 2 - 6572 (10)
where
A
S, = fitted number of Exocet missile equivalents with respect to missile kinetic
energy.
M) = ln(^)
A Chi-Square goodness of fit test produced a test statistic of 36.24 for which the null
hypothesis is rejected for any reasonable a. However, looking at the numbers which
generated the test statistic, two data points contributed to the majority of the magnitude,
the Muhafiz and the Joshan. Both of these incidents represent gross overkill situations for
which much smaller missiles would have accomplished the task. Subtracting out the
contribution of these two incidents, the test statistic value is 9.83. The null hypothesis is
not rejected at an a = 0.05. An R-squared value of 0.4414 was calculated for this model;
however, there were a number of attributes of the scenarios which were difficult to
quantitatively analyze. The damage control capability and training of the crews, impact
point of the missile, extent of compartmentation aboard the warship, and type of ship all
impacted the number of hits each ship was capable of taking. The ability to quantify each
of these categories would have been beneficial, but the data available would not support
such an effort.
The following figure displays the data plotted against the fitted line for ships put
out of action. Square data points represent superimposed data.
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Figure 2. Exocet missile equivalents with respect to kinetic energy versus natural
logarithm of full load displacement with fitted line (OOA).
A transformation such as a cube root or a natural logarithm of the Exocet missile
equivalents would have reduced the variation in the dependent variable; however, no
physical correlation could be easily recognized between a functional form of the dependent
variable and a real world phenomenon.
In contrast, curve-fitting methods work backward from the values they purport to
predict, arriving at coefficients (and, in some cases, even a whole model) justified solely
on the grounds of a good fit. [Ref. 5]
Reality must be the foundation when considering models to choose from. This purely
statistical analysis is explored in Appendix B.
26
E. DATA ANALSIS FOR SINKING
1. Analysis Procedure
The same procedure conducted for combat kills was done for ships that were sunk.
The same independent variable, dependent variable, and model structure were used as
above. This analysis proved more difficult for a number of reasons:
• There is less data, since more vessels were put out of action by missiles than
were sunk.
• It is much easier for attackers to concentrate fire on a wounded ship. They are
less likely to return fire, which essentially makes them defenseless targets. As
seen in the previous chapter, defenseless targets are hit with great accuracy.
Salvo warfare allows for multiple weapons to hit a target in a short time
interval, which makes analysis difficult on the minimum number of weapons
needed to sink a warship.
• The data was biased towards smaller vessels, since most sinkings occurred on
ships displacing 1000 tons or less.
For consistency, the same independent variable used for combat kills was used in this
model, the natural logarithm of full load displacement. The model used here went through
the same analysis steps as above. Figure 3 is a scatter plot of Exocet missile equivalents
with respect to warhead high explosive content versus full load displacement for warships
that sank. The line shown is an example of a power function which is a best fit curve to
the untransformed independent variable. Square data points represent superimposed data.
2. Results
The final form of the equation for ships sinking is as follows:
S, = 0.038 x(/(d,)) 20256 (11)
where
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EME(Warhead Wt) vs Disp (FL) for Ships Sunk
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Figure 3. Exocet missile equivalents with respect to warhead weight versus full load
displacement with fitted line (sinking).
A
S, = fitted total number of Exocet missile equivalents expressed in terms of
total warhead weight.
fid,) = ln«)
A Chi-Square goodness of fit test produced a test statistic of 23.78, for which the null
hypothesis is rejected for any reasonable a. However, looking at the numbers which
generated the test statistic, one data point contributed the majority of magnitude of the
test statistic. The sinking of the Eilat contributed 14.28 to the calculated test statistic.
This scenario represented gross overkill, with multiple missiles hitting the target in near
simultaneous fashion. The Styx missile was designed by the Russians to be used against
U. S. carriers displacing 60,000 tons or greater. Its use against the Eilat displacing 2,555
tons was obvious overkill. Subtracting out the contribution of this data point to the test
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statistic yields a statistic of 9.50, for which the null hypothesis is not rejected at a = 0.05.
An R-squared value of 0.3751 was calculated for this model. The following figure
displays the data plotted against the fitted line.




























Figure 4. Exocet missile equivalents with respect to warhead weight versus natural
logarithm of full load displacement with fitted line (sinking).
F. MODEL WEAKNESSES
There are some weaknesses to both models. Since data was not abundant, and
only a few conflicts generated the data analyzed, there was not a great spread in the full
load displacement of the ships hit with missiles, nor was there a great spread in the types
and sizes of weapons used. R-squared values for both models were not particularly high,
but there is some explanation for this. The missiles involved varied in points of impact on
the ships, type of warhead fuzing, and missile technology. The ships involved varied in
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types of warships, damage control capabilities of the crews of the ships, countries
involved, and ages of the warships hit, all of which were not addressed in the model.
G. CONCLUSION
The above analysis demonstrates that the two models produce credible measures
of: (1) small warship staying power against modern anti-ship cruise missiles, and (2)
number of anti-ship cruise missiles needed to produce a combat kill or sink a ship.
Problems which exist are the small data set and small ship sizes, so the "best" model must
await further data. Although there exists some unexplained variability in the models, the
fitted curves fit the existing data reasonably well, and can be used for further analysis.
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V. APPLICATION OF MODEL
The model developed above does not apply to all warships in littoral warfare, such
as the Arleigh Burke with its incredible defensive capability, but it can apply to at least
three types of U. S. warships, such as the Oliver Hazard Perry frigate (FFG-7 class), a
mine countermeasures ship (MCM-1 class), or a new coastal patrol ship (PC-1 class).
A raid is defined as an attack on a platform with multiple missiles arriving in a
compact time interval which does not allow the platform to recover from previous
damage, or counter an incoming threat due to saturation of defenses. The scenarios that
follow will all consist of a small, compact Exocet missile raid, since the analysis above was
based on Exocet missile equivalents.
A. FFG SCENARIO
It is evident from historical records that the FFG-7 class ship is vulnerable to
missile attacks. Most ships of this class have the ability to engage only one target at a time
due to fire control channel constraints. Therefore, it is conceivable that the FFG-7 class
ship in littoral waters could suffer the leaker rates determined in Chapter 3. Using the
leaker rate for a ship surprised, a value of 0.761, and the staying power of an FFG
calculated from the model, the expected number of missiles needed in a raid to put an FFG
out of action was calculated from equation ( 1 ). Under surprise conditions, a raid of size 3
would put the FFG out of action. To sink the FFG, under the same conditions, a raid of
size 5 would sink the warship. Under alerted conditions, similar calculations were
computed with the leaker probability equal to 0.544. To put an FFG out of action under
these conditions, a raid of size 4 would put the ship out of action, while a raid of size 7
would sink the ship.
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B. MCM SCENARIO
Avenger class mine countermeasure ships are particularly susceptable to missile
attack, since the primary area of operation is close to the shore. These ships have little
defensive capability and must be escorted. Depending on the capability of the escort, it is
conceivable that the MCM- 1 class ship in littoral waters could follow the leaker rates
determined above. Using the leaker rate for a ship surprised, a value of 0.761 , and the
staying power of an MCM calculated from the model, the expected number of missiles
needed in a raid to put an MCM out of action was calculated from equation (1). Under
surprise conditions, a raid of size 2 would put the MCM out of action. To sink the MCM,
under the same conditions, a raid of size 4 would sink the warship. Under alerted
conditions, similar calculations were computed with the leaker probability equal to 0.544.
To put an MCM out of action under these conditions, a raid of size 3 would put the ship
out of action, while a raid of size 5 would sink the ship.
C. PC SCENARIO
New construction coastal patrol ships were built to operate near the shore
delivering special forces personnel. With only Stinger missiles and guns for hardkill
defensive fire power and its small size and maneuverability as softkill features, it is
conceivable that the PC class ship in littoral waters could follow the leaker rates
determined above. Using the leaker rate for a ship surprised, a value of 0.76 1 , and the
staying power of a PC calculated from the model, the expected number of missiles needed
in a raid to put a PC out of action was calculated from equation (1). Under surprise
conditions, one Exocet missile would put the PC out of action. To sink the PC, under the
same conditions, a raid of three Exocet missiles would sink the warship. Under alerted
conditions, similar calculations were computed with the leaker probability equal to 0.544.
To put a PC out of action under these conditions, a raid of two Exocet missiles would put
the ship out of action, while a raid of three Exocets would sink the ship. Due to its small
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size and limited defensive capability, alerted or not to an incoming missile makes little
difference in the outcome with a raid of more than one missile.
Although little data is available on casualties in anti-ship missile incidents, what is
available provides some insight into the lethality of the missiles against personnel. The
warships hit suffered up to 25% of the crew killed, and up to 35% injured. On the
average, approximately 10% of the crews were killed in anti-ship missile incidents. This
figure equates to 21 deaths aboard a FFG-7, 8 deaths aboard a MCM- 1, and 3 deaths





There are many lessons to be learned from the historical record of anti-ship
missiles in combat. Historical missile hit probabilities are summarized in Table 4.
Total Probability of
Hit
Post 1982 Probability of
Hit
Defenseless Target 0.913 0.981
Defendable Target 0.684 0.630
Defended Target 0.264 0.450
Table 4. Probability of hit by category.
The trend in this data favors the anti-ship cruise missile, with a marked increase in the
probability of hitting a defended target. Ship defensive firepower and staying power must
increase proportionately if ships are to survive in combat situations of the future.
Softkill measures employed against anti-ship missiles were extremely successful,
seducing or decoying every missile it was used against. In every engagement where a
defender was alerted and deployed softkill measures, every missile salvo was entirely
defeated.
5
Hardkill measures were not as successful, with only one case confirmed. This is
understandable since hardkill measures used to date have primarily consisted of manual
firing systems. More data is needed to assess the combat capabilities of modern hardkill
systems.
For the ships in the data set, an average of 1.2 hits put the ships out of action,
while an average of 1.8 hits sank the ships. With these numbers, a leakage rate of 0.25 or
higher would have a disastrous impact on the outcome of the conflict. It is emphasized
5
Incidents 5. 7. 8, 13. 16.21.
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that the ordnance quantity-full load displacement relationship is based wholly on a
statistical correlation. It is hard to find a physical explanation for why combat kills would
correlate best with missile kinetic energy, while sinkings correlate best with missile
explosive content. It is also emphasized that because most anti-ship missile victims were
small warships, this analysis is unreliable when extended to warship larger than 7,000 tons
displacement. Accepting these cautions, Figure 5 is offered as the best possible functional
relationship between the number of anti-ship missile hits (normalized to Exocet missile
equivalents) and combat kills or sinkings as a function of warship size, based on 30
historical examples of warship damage.
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Figure 5. Exocet missile equivalents versus full load displacement for ships OOA and
ships sunk.
For ships displacing between 150 and 7000 tons, it takes two to three times the number of
missiles to sink a warship as it does to put it out of action.
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This analysis reached other interesting conclusions:
• The staying power of small combatants against anti-ship missiles varies with
the natural logarithm of the full load displacement. This differs from previous
studies done for bomb, shell, and torpedo damage which concluded that
staying power is proportional to the square or cube root of full load
displacement. The natural logarithm transformation produces a flatter curve
than the other transformations.
• The best statistical correlation for putting small warships out of action related
the natural logarithm of the full load displacement and kinetic energy content
of the missile. This relationship has not been examined in any previous study.
• The best statistical correlation for sinking a small warship occurred between
the natural logarithm of the full load displacement and the explosive content of
the warhead.
If the saying "history repeats itself comes true, the U. S. could learn from the past
that little effort is needed to make a big impact when using anti-ship missiles. Although
the HMS Gloucester shot down a Silkworm fired at the USS Missouri, a study of the
event shows that the results might easily have been a hit. [Ref. 6] The problems of
weapon systems cutout zones, failures to detect an incoming missile for a variety of
reasons, limited maneuvering room due to proximate minefields and inability to solve the
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) problem made engagement of the Silkworm very
problematic. This study shows that little coordination is needed on the part of an enemy
to put out of action or sink a frigate or smaller sized combatant. The U. S. must invest in
the ability of a warship to detect and defeat incoming missiles, or increase the staying
power of ships that are intended to sail in the littoral waters of an enemy.
As a side note, staying power is doubly important because it aids against secondary
threats as well as anti-ship missiles. Torpedo attacks can produce disastrous outcomes, as
seen by the Indian warship Khukri and the Argentine warship General Belgrano. The
Khukri was hit by three torpedoes and sunk within three minutes, killing 191 personnel,
while the Belgrano was hit by two torpedoes and sunk within one hour, killing 368
personnel. World War II also demonstrated the power of the torpedo, which was
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responsible for putting 19 U. S. cruisers out of action and sinking eleven. Mines can also
be formidable weapons, with the USS Samuel B. Roberts, the USS Tripoli, and the USS
Princeton the most recent examples of this. Research done at the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Carderock Division, produced a ship design which would increase the ships
staying power by a factor of 5, while only increasing the price by 25%. [Ref. 7]. This
increase in staying power would also increase the ships ability to withstand torpedo
attacks and mine attacks but to a lesser degree. Advances in staying power would not
only benefit the ship to counter anti-ship missiles, but would help to counter all threats.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
One obvious recommendation should be taken from this thesis:
• The use of softkill measures to defeat incoming missiles was effective in
combat.
All warships which are intended for littoral warfare scenarios should be equipped with
chaff, decoys and other softkill measures. These defensive weapons are proven in combat.
While hardkill should also be employed, its effectiveness has yet to be proven in a wartime
situation.
Recommendations for follow on work include:
• Adding more variables to the damage/sinking model to see if variability of data
can be more fully explained.
• Relating the missile firepower to bomb firepower and torpedo firepower, and
comparing the models developed here, with T. Beall and R. Humphrey
models.
Emphasis on ship self-defense and threat detection must continue to be the highest
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APPENDIX A. DATA COLLECTION






















Eilat DD 2,555 Styx 700 5,000 0.90 3
Khaibar DD 3,360 Styx 700 5,000 0.90 1
Badr DD 3,360 Styx 700 5,000 0.90 Not Sunk
Muhafiz MSC 375 Styx 700 5,000 0.90 1
T-43 MSO 500 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 3
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 70 2
Komar PBM 71 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 1
Komar PBM 71 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 1
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 2
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 2
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 2
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 2
Komar PBM 71 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 1
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 2
Osa PBM 200 Gabriel 143 920 0.70 2
Somellera PB 800 Sea Skua 66 450 0.85 2
A. Sobral PB 800 Sea Skua 66 450 0.85 Not Sunk
Sheffield DD 4,100 Exocet 250 1,439 0.93 1
Conveyor VTOL 14,946 Exocet 250 1,439 0.93 2
Glamorgan DD 6,200 Exocet 250 1,439 0.93 Not Sunk
Waheed PBM 311 Harpoon 350 1,168 0.85 1
Ean Zaquit PBM 850 Harpoon 350 1,168 0.85 2
Stark FFG 3,660 Exocet 250 1,439 0.93 2 Not Sunk
Joshan PBM 275 Standard 150 1,100 2.0 5
Sahand FF 1,540 Harpoon 350 1,168 0.85 3
Patrol Boat FPB 220 Sea Skua 66 450 0.85 2
T-43 MSO 500 Sea Skua 66 450 0.85 2 Not Sunk
k5
TNC-45 PB 265 Sea Skua 66 450 0.85 2 Not Sunk
TNC-45 PB 265 Sea Skua 66 450 0.85 2 Not Sunk
Mauvenet DD 3.375 Sparrow 90 503 2.5 1 Not Sunk
Table A- 1 . Raw Data
1*6
APPENDIX B. ALTERNATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
This appendix explores an alternate method of data analysis. This method shows
no partiality towards reality, and only seeks to fit a line to the data. Analysis conducted in
this thesis previously sought to relate full load displacement of warships with Exocet
missile equivalents. These quantities are easily related to physical phenomenon. Scatter,
however, is quite prominent in the data set. In order to reduce some of the variation in the
dependent variable, transformations, such as cube roots and natural logarithm were taken
of the dependent variable. The same models as above were fitted to the data. The
drawback to this type of analysis is the final model lacks a solid connection to physical
realities for which it was designed to explain. Figure B-l represents the "best fit" model,
with the highest R-squared value and the lowest Chi-square goodness of fit test value for
ships put out of action. Although the R-squared value remains unchanged, the calculated
Chi-square test statistic reduced to 1 .79, for which the null hypothesis is not rejected at
any reasonable a. In doing this transformation, the statistician is satisfied, but the model
hides the obvious overkill scenarios which were present.
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Figure B- 1. Exocet missile equivalent versus natural logarithm of full load displacement
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